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Rethinking Resilience Analytics
Daniel Eisenberg,1 Thomas Seager,2 and David L. Alderson1,∗
The concept of “resilience analytics” has recently been proposed as a means to leverage the
promise of big data to improve the resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure sys-
tems and the communities supported by them. Given recent advances in machine learning
and other data-driven analytic techniques, as well as the prevalence of high-profile natu-
ral and man-made disasters, the temptation to pursue resilience analytics without question
is almost overwhelming. Indeed, we find big data analytics capable to support resilience to
rare, situational surprises captured in analytic models. Nonetheless, this article examines the
efficacy of resilience analytics by answering a single motivating question: Can big data ana-
lytics help cyber–physical–social (CPS) systems adapt to surprise? This article explains the
limitations of resilience analytics when critical infrastructure systems are challenged by fun-
damental surprises never conceived during model development. In these cases, adoption of
resilience analytics may prove either useless for decision support or harmful by increasing
dangers during unprecedented events. We demonstrate that these dangers are not limited
to a single CPS context by highlighting the limits of analytic models during hurricanes, dam
failures, blackouts, and stock market crashes. We conclude that resilience analytics alone are
not able to adapt to the very events that motivate their use and may, ironically, make CPS
systems more vulnerable. We present avenues for future research to address this deficiency,
with emphasis on improvisation to adapt CPS systems to fundamental surprise.
KEY WORDS: Analytics; infrastructure; resilience; surprise
1. THE ALLURE OF RESILIENCE
ANALYTICS
Recent advances in information technologies
have reduced the marginal cost of capturing, process-
ing, and using data by several orders of magnitude.
Internet-connected devices, ranging from ther-
mostats to toilets to traffic signals, can now function
as both sensors that report on the environment and as
actuators that attempt to control it. Similarly, social
media applications now collect massive data from
crowd-sourced observations, including earthquake
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and infectious disease impacts, in an effort to im-
prove detection and response actions. This ability to
connect data and decision—at large scale and in real
time—creates new capabilities for society to respond
and adapt to an increasingly volatile world.
This emergence of so-called big data requires
associated “big data analytics” to reveal patterns,
trends, and associations between physical systems
and human behavior, but the technologies here are
still nascent. For example, Google Flu Trends was
launched in 2008 to improve the detection and pre-
diction of influenza outbreaks in the United States
by analyzing search terms. At first, it improved ex-
isting methods for rapid, reliable predictions of data
later reported by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (Ginsberg et al., 2009), but then sur-
prisingly stopped working (Lazer, Kennedy, King, &
Vespignani, 2014) and was ultimately abandoned as a
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stand-alone service in 2015 (Google AI Blog, 2015).
The service, which once was heralded as a “poster
child” for the power of data analytics, is now re-
garded as a cautionary tale of “big data hubris”
(Lazer et al., 2014) for modelers and users alike.
Nevertheless, data analytics for improved deci-
sion making has considerable implications for the
field of risk analysis. (See, e.g., the August 2017 Spe-
cial Issue of Risk Analysis, i.e., Choi & Lambert,
2017.) The implications for resilience are less well in-
vestigated. For the purposes of this work, we focus
on analytics developed for improving the resilience
of critical infrastructure systems such as those sup-
porting hurricane prediction, flood protection, finan-
cial markets, and the electric grid. These systems
are critical because they provide services that ensure
the safety and function of society; are complex due
to their multiple functions, interdependencies, and
human–technological interactions; and they produce
significant amounts of real-time data. Critical infras-
tructure resilience is broadly understood as the abil-
ity for these systems to adapt to adverse events that
impact their functioning, where many definitions of
resilience exist depending on infrastructure context
(Cutter et al., 2013; Pritzker & May, 2016; The White
House, 2013).
Barker et al. (2017) coined the term resilience an-
alytics to mean “the systematic use of advanced data-
driven methods to understand, visualize, design, and
manage interdependent infrastructures to enhance
their resilience and the resilience of the communities
and services that rely upon them.” The term empha-
sizes the use of analytics in support of critical infras-
tructure operations and management decisions. They
categorize critical infrastructure as cyber–physical–
social (CPS) systems composed of: (1) infrastructure
networks “that enable essential ‘lifeline’ services for
society (e.g., transportation, electric, power, commu-
nications)”; (2) service networks composed of “hu-
man systems that engage with these infrastructure
systems during a disruption (e.g., emergency respon-
ders, humanitarian relief, debris removal)”; and (3)
community networks of “the interconnected society
that the other networks support (e.g., relationships
among people and communities).” Given that the
complexities of multilayered, interdependent CPS
systems are beyond the comprehension of any single
individual or organization, the promise of resilience
analytics is that more data and advanced computa-
tional techniques will result in faster and better deci-
sion making, with fewer cascading losses, deaths, and
economic impacts.
If resilience analytics can deliver on these
promises and reduce the calamitous impacts of in-
frastructure failure and natural disaster, it is no
surprise that stakeholder groups including gov-
ernment agencies, first responders, infrastructure
providers, and others might rush to adopt the most
advanced computational techniques. Government
(Comptroller of the United States, 2017; U.S. Gov-
ernment, 2019) and the military (Eckstein, 2017) are
now working quickly to try to make sense of data
analytics and turn it into tactical, operational, and
strategic advantage. However, without critical exam-
ination of the assumptions of existing analytics and
the limitations they create, it is unclear if resilience
analytics will truly result in faster and better decision
making for CPS systems. Resilience analytics may
go the way of Google Flu Trends and simply stop
working, or worse, their use may, ironically, expose
the public to grave dangers resulting from overconfi-
dence, myopia, loss of adaptive or innovative capac-
ity, and/or misconceptions that result in more brittle
CPS systems.
In this article, we interrogate resilience analyt-
ics by answering a single question: Can big data an-
alytics help CPS systems adapt to surprise? We find
that resilience analytics may be capable to adapt to
situational surprises, but will remain unable to adapt
to fundamental surprises that cannot be predicted a
priori. Unfortunately, critical infrastructure remains
vulnerable to events like unprecedented hurricanes,
failing dams, cascading blackouts, and stock market
flash crashes. We conclude that the promise of re-
silience analytics is limited not by computational ca-
pability but by a lack of knowledge of how systems
improvise when models are deemed useless or harm-
ful. Future research should focus on understanding
the context in which resilience analytics are used and
delineating how improvisation occurs with respect to
analytics. Without this knowledge, efforts to improve
CPS resilience with big data analytics can lead to
greater vulnerability.
2. THE ROLE OF MODELS AND MODELERS
Before we can examine resilience analytics, we
must understand how they are developed and used
in CPS systems. In general, analytics harness the
availability of big data to inform decisions through
the application of statistical and mathematical mod-
els. Because there is no single definition of “model,”
for simplicity we adopt the lexicon of Brown (2018):
“A model is an abstraction that emphasizes certain
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aspects of reality to assess or understand the behav-
ior of a system under study.” This definition is broad
enough to cover a range of models, including physical
models (e.g., miniature vehicles or buildings), logical
models (e.g., of software dependencies), mathemati-
cal models (e.g., functions), information models (e.g.,
infographics), and/or any combination thereof poten-
tially scaling to represent all the working CPS infras-
tructure across a region. Resilience analytics can be
classified in three subcategories based on their use
(Barker et al., 2017; Rose, 2016):
 Descriptive analytics describe and help visualize
the performance of a system.
 Predictive analytics determine complex pat-
terns, relationships among variables, and quan-
tify the likelihood of future events.
 Prescriptive analytics identify and evaluate a
feasible course of action given a set of con-
straints, possible interventions, and objectives.
All analytics rely on embedded models that dic-
tate their inputs, outputs, and use. Predictive and
prescriptive analytics often rely on explicit models
such as mathematical equations and algorithms to
guide user decisions and actions. In contrast, descrip-
tive analytics often rely on implicit models, such as
the choice of what data to collect (logical models)
or how to manipulate and present data (information
models).
2.1. A Conceptual Look at Big Data Analytics in
CPS Systems
Fig. 1 depicts a common story for how big data
analytics are deployed in CPS systems to support re-
silience. A Model that captures key characteristics of
the real world (e.g., here we represent the Earth as
a simple circle) is embedded in analytics that take in
high velocity, volume, and variety information assets
from the real world and transform them into useful
outputs for a User (i.e., an operator, manager, reg-
ulator, engineer, or other embedded in a CPS ser-
vice and community network). The User can further
query the analytics to achieve the goals of describing,
predicting, or prescribing a particular phenomenon.
The User then takes actions that change the real
world, feeding back new information assets into an-
alytic models. Together, the interaction between big
data, analytics, models, users, and the real world cre-
ates a simple sociotechnical feedback loop relevant
to any CPS context.
The capability for analytics to improve User de-
cision making and actions via the feedback loop in
Fig. 1 has been a major success story of the last
decade and helps drive the increased use of ma-
chine learning techniques. This is emphasized in the
development and deployment of machine learning
models (see Huddleston & Brown, 2018, for more de-
tailed explanation of this process). For example, su-
pervised learning models start with an initial data set
to “train” and “tune” machine learning algorithms
and identify which one serves User goals. The se-
lected model is further trained, tested, and validated
against different data before being deployed for the
User. A key issue in model development is the extent
to which the Model can “generalize” to handle data
that were not considered during training, testing, and
validation. Problems can arise when the training data
are not representative of the real world or when pat-
terns in real data simply do not exist. Iterative feed-
back with the User as seen in Fig. 1 is helpful because
the deployed analytic model can improve over time
(i.e., “learn”) as it interacts with more data.
However, this story of analytics is incomplete be-
cause it does not include the Modeler who interprets
the stated goals of the User to develop the analytic
model. This translation is not simple. All Modelers
have their own backgrounds, beliefs, goals, needs,
and other personal and contextual values comprising
a frame of reference (also called a preanalytic vision;
see Costanza, 2001; Schumpeter, 1954). This frame of
reference may be quite different from the User’s per-
sonal and contextual values that influence the User’s
actions (also called a decision frame; see Simon et al.,
1987). In the case where the Modeler and the User
are distinct individuals, their alignment of goals de-
pends on communication throughout model devel-
opment and use, and discrepancies among these two
sets of values may limit resulting analytics. For ex-
ample, it is common for a User’s decision frame to
change over time and render previous modeling ef-
forts obsolete. Similarly, a Modeler’s preanalytic vi-
sion may include technical decisions that reduce the
accuracy, throughput, and usability of analytics with
or without User knowledge. (Anecdotal “war sto-
ries” of analysts are rife with tales where misunder-
standing between Modeler and User led to project
failure.) Where pragmatic and technical needs con-
flict, User and Modeler values may differ even when
they are the same individual.
Thus, it is necessary to separate the Modeler
from the User and add additional dependencies into
Fig. 1 that represent the influence a Modeler has
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Fig. 1. A simplified representation of analytics to support user decisions. Big data from the real world are fed as input into a model where
they are transformed into support for the stated goals of a User to describe, predict, or prescribe behavior in a complex cyber–physical–
social (CPS) system. A User can query the model, then decide and act upon model outputs. Actions taken by a User affect the real world
and subsequently feed new data inputs back into the analytic model.
on the feedback loop. Fig. 2 depicts this augmented
view with Modeler and User frames of reference, the
alignment of goals between them, and the actions
taken by a Modeler to develop and deploy analyt-
ics. Fig. 2 is illustrated to emphasize that the Mod-
eler’s values are embedded in analytics, conceptu-
ally described by experts as “the modeler is in the
model”(Woods, personal communication, 2017a).
2.2. Three Confounding Dependencies for
Resilience Analytics
For resilience analytics, model development
is guided by common values found across infras-
tructure sectors, federal agencies, and academic
literature. Examples of User goals are captured in
resilience definitions across the U.S. federal govern-
ment, such as improving the ability for infrastructure
systems “to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover
from, and adapt to adverse events”(Cutter et al.,
2013); the ability of service providers and organiza-
tions “to recognize threats and hazards and make
adjustments that will improve future protection
efforts and risk reduction measures”(The White
House, 2013); and the ability of communities “to
prepare for anticipated hazards, adapt to changing
conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from
disruptions”(Pritzker & May, 2016). The purpose
of a Modeler, then, is to produce analytics that
support User actions like improved crisis planning
and recovery for CPS systems.
Bringing the Modeler in the loop, however, in-
troduces three dependencies that challenge whether
resilience analytics can support these goals. The first
dependency is between the User and Modeler repre-
senting the necessity for translation and interpreta-
tion of User goals and values. This dependency em-
phasizes that poor communication and alignment of
goals may produce models that do not support User
actions. George Box’s famous aphorism “[a]ll models
are wrong, but some are useful” reminds us that an-
alytics are only meaningful in their decision context,
which may be unavailable to a Modeler. Following
Box’s aphorism, useful resilience analytics are those
that help CPS networks withstand, adapt to, and re-
cover from disruptions. A key goal for the Modeler is
to avoid deploying useless or harmful resilience ana-
lytics, that is, those that do not support these actions
or make them more difficult.
The second dependency is between the Mod-
eler and the Model, representing embedded values
in data analytics. Since the Modeler’s values (not the
User’s) are embedded in the Model, only a Mod-
eler can fully explain how their analytics work. A
growing issue with analytics is model transparency,
that is, the extent to which the output of a model
can be readily explained. Users often view analyt-
ics as a “black box” and cannot meaningfully explain
how they transform inputs and/or assumptions into
descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive support. In
such cases, the Modeler must explain what the model
has produced as output and why the result makes
sense. Unfortunately, there are situations where an-
alytic models are a black box to the Modeler as well.
Automated machine learning techniques, in partic-
ular, can result in models that lack transparency to
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Fig. 2. The relationship between analytic models, users, modelers, and the real world. The inclusion of a “Modeler” who creates and updates
big data analytics introduces additional dependencies that confound the simple model. Both the interpretation of a User’s decision frame
by the Modeler and the influence of real-world stimuli on Modeler may produce an incomplete preanalytic vision and lead to inappropriate
analytic models.
their Modeler (Knight, 2017). For these black boxes,
it may be impossible to identify how Modeler values
are embedded in analytics. This makes it even more
difficult to ensure resilience analytics are “useful” to
a User’s needs and/or reconcile differences between
Modeler and User values.
The third dependency is between the real world
and the Modeler representing the way in which a
Modeler’s values and preanalytic vision are influ-
enced by external stimuli. Analytic models must
be updated and modified regularly. The process of
sensemaking, in particular, emphasizes that User and
Modeler values will change their understanding of
infrastructure over time (Weick, 1989, 2009) and will
require new analytics. While some of this change
is captured in the machine learning process, more
dramatic shifts in values that dictate a need for a
new model cannot be. For resilience, the models
necessary to describe, predict, and prescribe many
extreme events do not yet exist, meaning resilience
analytics produced today will likely need to change
in the future. Costanza (2001) elaborates this fact by
emphasizing that the credibility of analytics depends
on constant reconciliation between a Modeler’s
values and a User’s values, both of which change
over time: “[C]redibility proceeds from honest
discussion of this underlying [preanalytic] vision and
its inherently subjective elements, as well as from
constant, pragmatic testing of conclusions against
real-world problems, rather than by appealing to
a nonexistent objectivity . . . . [T]he ultimate goal is
therefore not truth, but quality and utility.”
Together, these three dependencies create un-
derappreciated limits on the use of resilience analyt-
ics for CPS systems.
3. SURPRISE HAPPENS
Foundational to the notion of resilience is that
a system can adapt to situations or events that have
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never been experienced before. Specifically, for an-
alytics to improve the resilience of CPS systems, the
feedback loop in Fig. 2 needs to be responsive to ex-
treme and/or unforeseeable natural and man-made
disruptions that challenge lifeline services, infrastruc-
ture management practices, and community safety
and security. We refer generally to these novel or
rare situations as surprises, and an important ques-
tion for the development of resilience analytics is:
Can big data analytics help CPS systems adapt to
surprise?
To answer this question, one must distinguish
surprises apart from normal events (see Table I). We
define normal events as situations where CPS systems
operate according to previous beliefs, there are no
contingencies to avert, and nothing new is experi-
enced. To define surprise, we rely on the work of cog-
nitive scientists, who typically distinguish between
two types: situational surprise and fundamental sur-
prise. Seminal work by Lanir (1986) and Wears and
Webb (2014) describes four distinguishing features:
“[First] fundamental surprise refutes basic beliefs
about ‘how things work,’ while situational surprise
is compatible with previous beliefs. Second, in fun-
damental surprise one cannot define in advance the
issues for which one must be alert. Third, situational
and fundamental surprise differ in the value brought
by information about the future. Situational surprise
can be averted or mitigated by such foresight, while
advance information on fundamental surprise actu-
ally causes the surprise. . . . And finally, learning from
situational surprise seems easy, but learning from
fundamental surprise is difficult.” Table I summa-
rizes key distinctions between normal events, situa-
tional surprise, and fundamental surprise.
Situational and fundamental surprise appear
within two distinct feedback loops for big data an-
alytics, as depicted in Fig. 3. Feedback within the
blue “inner loop” (denoted here as Type 1) involves
data that are fed into models and can include situ-
ational surprise. Analytics like those harnessing su-
pervised machine learning models can automatically
adjust behavior to discrepancies between model out-
puts and observations from situational surprises.
In contrast, fundamental surprise—that chal-
lenges the decision frame of the User and/or the pre-
analytic vision of the Modeler—proceeds in a red
“outer loop” that bypasses automated model feed-
back (denoted here as Type-2 feedback). Accord-
ingly, Type-1 feedback is unresponsive to fundamen-
tal surprise because it cannot change the User or
Modeler values embedded in a model. Again, this is
exemplified by machine learning models that fail to
“learn” when deployed in situations they were inap-
propriately trained for or where no underlying pat-
terns in real data exist. There is no current way for
big data analytics to adapt their internal structure
to these situations on their own. A Modeler must
adapt analytics when a fundamental surprise ren-
ders the current Model obsolete. In situations that
change the User’s decision frame, without Type-2
feedback for communication and alignment of goals,
there is no way to fundamentally change the central
model. Because adaptation to fundamental surprise
can only occur via Type-2 feedback, even the most
advanced machine learning or artificial intelligence
models cannot respond to fundamental surprise, and
by extension cannot adapt to it.
The key point is that the Modeler, not the Model,
creates both limitations on how big data analytics
support User goals and provides the solution for how
to adapt analytic models to fundamental surprise. In-
cluding the Modeler “in the loop” recognizes that
analytics are susceptible to having the wrong prean-
alytic vision during initial model development. An-
alytics with useless models that are predicated on
misconceptions or draw our attention to the wrong
things cannot be improved by better data or ma-
chine learning techniques. In fact, more and better
information assets in a useless model may become
harmful by reinforcing misconceptions embedded in
results, leading to greater danger resulting from a
false sense of security and/or poor decision making.
A view of resilience analytics that only considers the
inner loop in Fig. 3 is susceptible to the danger of
fundamental surprise in this manner.
Similarly, CPS systems faced with fundamental
surprise require a Modeler-in-the-loop to adapt big
data analytics and ensure resilience to unforeseen
events. When modelers identify new ways to struc-
ture analytics that were otherwise unknown during
initial model development or users determine cur-
rent model outputs obsolete, resilience requires the
model to fundamentally change.
Thus, analytics can help CPS systems adapt to
surprise if and only if it is a situational surprise. Big
data analytics on their own cannot help CPS systems
adapt to fundamental surprise. In situations where
fundamental surprise occurs, no Model in the ab-
sence of Type-2 feedback, no matter how well in-
formed with observation during its initial develop-
ment, can achieve the goals of resilience analytics.
At minimum, resilience requires Type-2 feedback to
adapt models deemed useless or harmful, even if
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Table I. Contrasting Features of Normal Events, Situational Surprise, and Fundamental Surprise
Normal Events Situational Surprise Fundamental Surprise
Events occur according to
previous beliefs
Events are compatible with
previous beliefs




Failures and system responses are
well-modeled or measurable
One cannot define in advance the issues
for which one must model or measure
No contingencies to avert or
manage
Surprise can be averted or
mitigated with information
about the future
Advance information about events
causes even greater surprise
Nothing new to learn Learning seems easy Learning is challenging
Example Example Example
Purchase lottery ticket, then
lose the lottery
Purchase lottery ticket, then win
the lottery
Do not purchase lottery ticket, then win
the lottery
this form of feedback is also the reason why George
Box’s aphorism remains true.
4. SURPRISE IN CPS SYSTEMS
The nature of surprise suggests that the answer
to our guiding question—Can resilience analytics
help CPS systems adapt to surprise?—depends on
the User and Modeler, not just the analytics. In gen-
eral, disruptions to CPS systems can take the form
of situational surprise (e.g., the failure of a known
component), and here big data analytics can improve
resilience (e.g., by anticipating when the compo-
nent should be replaced preemptively). Searching
for anomalies that cause situational surprise is a
normal activity (e.g., testing and debugging) and
often reveals underappreciated dependencies among
physical and digital assets (Woods, 2017b). User
and Modeler can automate this process with Type-1
feedback to help ameliorate situational surprises
before, during, and after they occur.
However, disruptions can also take the form of
fundamental surprise (e.g., failure of a previously un-
known component) that changes the understanding
of how the CPS system actually works. The com-
plex nature of many CPS systems makes it diffi-
cult to know all relevant dependencies that may
cause, exacerbate, or even help mitigate a disruption.
These unknown dependencies are often revealed
when changes in environmental context and in soci-
etal needs alter the background, beliefs, and goals of
a User and/or Modeler in such a way that previous
conceptions of the CPS system become irrelevant.
For example, engineers are realizing that growing ex-
tremes in weather events mean that historical data
are no longer representative of future events (Milly
et al., 2008), radically changing the design loads for
civil projects that manage lifeline services.
The ways User and Modeler adapt to these fun-
damentally new situations ultimately dictates the re-
silience of CPS systems. Specifically, the ability of
a CPS system to harness Type-2 feedback and im-
provise new models and decisions when faced with
fundamental surprise is critically important to the fu-
ture development of resilience analytics. We consider
four representative disruptions in CPS systems moti-
vating this need.
4.1. Collective Improvisation by User and Modeler
The combined system in Fig. 3 shows that both
User and Modeler can participate in Type-2 feedback
when faced with fundamental surprise. The ideal sit-
uation is one where User and Modeler coordinate
their efforts with sufficient time to generate new ana-
lytics that describe, predict, and prescribe previously
unforeseen events.
Example: Hurricane Ophelia
The hurricane season of 2017 was marked with
numerous Category-5 storms that caused catas-
trophic damages across the Atlantic and Caribbean.
The United States alone suffered unprecedented
damage to infrastructure systems in Texas, Florida,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, breaking
records for inundation in Houston and infrastructure
recovery time in Puerto Rico.
Notwithstanding these catastrophes, perhaps
the most surprising hurricane of the season from an
analytics perspective was Hurricane Ophelia. Unlike
other Atlantic hurricanes that made landfall in North
America, Ophelia progressed toward Europe to
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Fig. 3. Surprise from the real world creates two distinct feedback loops. Type-1 feedback (via the “inner loop” denoted in blue) that feeds
big data into analytic models can contain situational surprise, in the form of data that are unexpected but still “fit” within the model structure.
In the “outer loop” (Type-2 feedback, denoted in red), novel and rare experiences may characteristically change a user’s decision frame or
a modeler’s preanalytic vision (i.e., fundamental surprise), which may upend previous model assumptions and require the development of
entirely new analytics.
become “the farthest east Major Hurricane
(Category-3 or higher) on record in the Atlantic
Basin” (Met Éireann, Government of Ireland, 2018).
Ophelia was fundamentally surprising because it
followed an “extremely weird” path toward Europe
and made landfall in Ireland and the United King-
dom (Mersereau, 2017). The significant deviation in
path led Ophelia to reveal possibly underappreciated
limitations in predictive models from the U.S. Na-
tional Hurricane Center (NHC); see Fig. 4. Prior to
Hurricane Ophelia, NHC models designed to predict
tropical-storm-force winds were not developed to
visualize past (0◦, 60◦N), creating a sharp corner
in hurricane wind-speed predictions and visually
showing fundamental surprise. The relatively slow
speed of storm advance allowed User and Modeler
to recognize this surprise, and an updated projection
12 hours later for the same storm corrected the issue.
4.2. Improvisation Without a Modeler
A common breakdown of Type-2 feedback is
when there is no Modeler “in the loop” to update
analytics (see Fig. 5). When fundamental surprise
reveals to a User that the current model is flawed
and/or changes a User’s frame of reference, resilient
crisis response may require the User to make de-
cisions without analytic support (i.e., abandon the
Model). This situation renders previously “useful”
analytics “useless,” and forces a User to improvise,
that is, rely on own expertise and heuristics for navi-
gating the surprise.
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Fig. 4. U.S. National Hurricane Center (NHC) five-day probability of tropical-storm-force winds for hurricane Ophelia in October 2017.
Left: Projection as of October 13, 2017 02:00 AST (U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2019); fundamental
surprise appears as missing projections beyond (0◦, 60◦N). Right: Projection as of October 13, 2017 14:00 AST (Met Éireann, Govern-
ment of Ireland, 2018); adaptation on the part of the User and the Modeler results in updated analytics. Copyright: Public Domain, see
http://www.weather.gov/disclaimer.
Example: The Near-Breaching of the Oroville Dam
The heavy rains of winter 2017 on the West
Coast of the United States ended one of the most
serious droughts on record in California. However,
a component failure at the Oroville Dam in north-
ern California resulted in the largest evacuation or-
der in the history of the state, and nearly resulted
in catastrophic collapse of the tallest dam in the
United States (California Department of Water Re-
sources, 2017, 2018; Hollins, Eisenberg, & Seager,
2018). Prior to the crisis, the frame of reference for
the California Department of Water Resources and
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
was to make decisions based on reservoir-wide risk
analyses that identified potential dam failure modes.
The most recent analysis in 2014 ignored structural
problems from initial dam design, insufficient main-
tenance practices, and poor mountainside geological
conditions. Nonetheless, given the prevailing drought
conditions and the fact that the dam had successfully
withstood prior flood events, none of these concerns
were treated as urgent.
During February 2017, a series of rainstorms
filled the reservoir, necessitating opening of the pri-
mary spillway of the Oroville Dam to reduce water
levels in accordance with the operating procedures
that govern dam management. However, cracks
opened in the concrete surface of the primary spill-
way almost immediately, and dam operators were
faced with the complex decision of whether to con-
tinue using the broken primary spillway, or use the
ungated, emergency spillway that directed water over
an unprotected, earthen section of the dam. Despite
nearly five decades of dam operation, the emergency
spillway had never been activated, so operators had
no experiential basis from which to predict how it
would perform (California Department of Water
Resources, 2017, 2018; Hollins et al., 2018). Experts
were divided between these two choices. Some
operations personnel, management executives, and
regulators favored maintaining the frame of refer-
ence that the emergency spillway would be safe to
operate. However, safety engineers and emergency
managers preferred continuing to use the broken pri-
mary spillway, given the lack of experience with the
emergency spillway. Decisions to continue operating
the broken primary spillway at reduced flow rates
resulted in activation of the emergency spillway and
uncontrolled flow down the hillside. Within minutes,
geologists identified a fundamental surprise of down-
stream erosion that threatened immediate hillside
collapse and reservoir containment failure. Onsite
incident commanders had time only to order and
implement an evacuation of local emergency per-
sonnel, leaving operators controlling the sluice gates
on the primary spillway to improvise on their own.
These operators quickly abandoned prior belief in a
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Fig. 5. Fundamental surprise experienced by a User with no Modeler-in-the-loop. When there is no “Modeler-in-the-loop” and the User
deems current analytics as useless or harmful, there is no effective way to communicate new analytic needs and adapt models to funda-
mentally new situations. The User has little choice but to abandon the analytics (represented by the X’s) and improvise actions without
additional decision support.
functional emergency spillway with the improvisa-
tion action of opening the primary spillway gate to
unprecedented flow rates. This flow caused even
more damage to the primary spillway, but the result-
ing reduction in water levels redirected water from
the emergency spillway prior to catastrophic collapse
of the reservoir containment.
4.3. Improvisation Without a User
Another increasingly common situation that in-
hibits Type-2 feedback is when the role of the User
is automated, and the Modeler must respond to a
fundamental surprise without a User-in-the-loop (see
Fig. 6). Many CPS systems and industrial controls op-
erate on timescales faster than humans can respond.
In these cases, automation of resilience analytics can
create new adaptive capacity to situational surprises,
but can be maladaptive in response to fundamen-
tal surprise (i.e., they preclude the possibility of a
User-in-the-loop). In situations when CPS systems
experience a fundamental surprise with no User, it
is now up to the Modeler to improvise and try new
analytics.
Example: The Arizona-Southern California Power
Outage
On September 8, 2011, an 11-minute system
disturbance left 2.7 million customers without power
for up to 12 hours across the southwestern United
States and Northwest Mexico (including the entire
city of San Diego, CA; see Clark, Chester, Seager, &
Eisenberg, 2018). The event was initiated by the loss
of a single, extra high-voltage (500 kV) powerline
near Yuma, Arizona that led to instantaneous power
redistribution, voltage deviations, and overloads
across the region (Veloza & Santamaria, 2016).
This caused a cascade of losses as infrastructure
tripped offline and initiated automatic load shed-
ding. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) and North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) found 27 separate issues
that contributed to the cascade (Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, North American Elec-
tric Reliability Council, 2012), nearly all of which
stemmed from analytics and automated controls that
precluded timely operator action. Specifically, the
system relied on models that made important power
system information difficult for operators to access
and protection schemes that tripped infrastructure
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Fig. 6. Fundamental surprise experienced by modelers with no User-in-the-loop. In cases like large-scale blackouts, the User-in-the-loop is
a technological system that acts at the scale and speed of infrastructure. Modelers that experience fundamental surprise in these situations
have no effective way to align analytic needs to fundamentally new situations. The translation of a new frame of reference into new analytic
models may be too slow to interdict maladaptive actions hard coded into existing models and technologies. Type-2 feedback is lost where
red “Xs” are shown.
out of service before operators could respond.
Moreover, planning models for next-day, seasonal,
and long-term operations were fundamentally flawed
in ways that were unknown, underappreciated, or
ignored prior to the event. The combination of these
issues precluded secure system operation despite
the fact that the southwestern power system was
designed and could have been operated to with-
stand the loss of the powerline. FERC and NERC
concluded that the event could have been managed
within the 30-minute window normally afforded to
contingency operations; this resulted in six regula-
tory settlements between FERC and regional electric
power authorities to update models and analytic
capabilities above and beyond reliability standards
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015).
4.4. Improvisation Without a User or Modeler
The most challenging situation for a CPS system
to respond to fundamental surprise is when the User
has been replaced by automation and the Modeler is
unavailable over the timescale at which the analytics
need to be modified.
Example: Flash Crashes in the Stock Market
The increased use of computer-assisted trading
(which itself is a form of analytics) in financial
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markets provides several examples where the ra-
pidity of information flow through models and the
absence of a User-in-the-loop limits the ability of
the system to respond in the face of surprise. The
first of these is the infamous Stock Market Crash of
1987, during which the Standard & Poor’s Index fell
approximately 20% in a single day. Carlson (2007)
details the causes of the crash, among which was “an
increase in the use of ‘program trading’ strategies,
where computers were set up to quickly trade
particular amounts of a large number of stocks, such
as those in a particular stock index, when certain
conditions were met.” Specifically, there was a rise
in the use of program trading to implement “port-
folio insurance” strategies that automatically trade
financial instruments such as index futures to hedge
against falling markets. In the presence of an initial
decline, these automated systems can trigger a cas-
cading effect in which price declines trigger selling,
which induces additional price declines, and so on.
The increased use of automated quotation systems
at the time further enabled this cascade to travel
internationally (Roll, 1988). If human traders had
been “in the loop,” they may have been able to slow
or arrest these cascading effects by switching trading
strategies as they occurred. Ironically, Shiller (1988)
argues that many investors were actually anticipating
a crash, which increased the popularity of automated
portfolio insurance and ultimately facilitated the
crash.
Over the subsequent 30 years, human traders
have been increasingly replaced by algorithms that
respond at the speed of light to changes in the mar-
ket. In the current environment, trading firms com-
pete to locate their computer trading operations as
close as possible to electronic exchanges so as to
reap the benefits afforded by fractions of a second
(Lewis & Baker, 2014). In the presence of Type-2
feedback requiring fundamental changes to analytics
(due to the realization of flawed assumptions, unan-
ticipated interactions in the market, or the discov-
ery of flaws in the model itself), the Modeler often
does not have time to revise or repair the Model.
This use of high-frequency trading is largely cred-
ited with causing the Flash Crash of 2010 (Kirilenko,
Kyle, Samadi, & Tuzun, 2017) during which the Dow
Jones Industrial Average index dropped more than
900 points (approximately 9%) in less than five min-
utes, and then regained much of that over the sub-
sequent 15 minutes. Since that time, additional mini-
flash crashes have occurred (Golub, Keane, & Poon,
2012), and sometimes the only reasonable response
to unexpected behavior is to shut down an exchange
(McCrank, 2015).
5. A PATH FORWARD FOR RESILIENCE
ANALYTICS
Recognition that CPS systems are susceptible to
fundamental surprise reveals a critical need to re-
think resilience analytics. Despite how useful ana-
lytics may be during situational surprises, they are
insufficient for resilience. CPS systems will experi-
ence fundamental surprises that reveal “useful” ana-
lytics as outdated, incomplete, inadequate, and even
harmful. The previous examples show that the an-
swer to our guiding question is “no”—big data ana-
lytics cannot help CPS systems adapt to fundamental
surprise without Modelers and Users to respond to
Type-2 feedback.
A path forward for resilience analytics is to com-
plement research on data-driven techniques with re-
search on understanding the context-dependent im-
plications of improvisation. When CPS systems are
faced with fundamental surprise, the best (and possi-
bly only) course of action is to improvise. A challenge
for resilience analytics is that the capacity for a CPS
system to improvise is dictated by the frame of refer-
ence held by individuals and groups. Combining ob-
jective analytic models with these subjective under-
standings of resilience remains an important area of
research for CPS systems. Unfortunately, we are not
yet at the point where we can deploy analytics in a
resilient way because we still lack theory, methods,
and tools for improvisation to adapt systems to fun-
damental surprise.
5.1. A Framework for Research on Improvisation
with Resilience Analytics
The role of User- and Modeler-in-the-loop
establishes a framework to guide future research in
improvisation (see Fig. 7). Because User and Mod-
eler serve different roles in CPS systems, they bring
different capacities for improvisation. Our discussion
of Type-2 feedback and examples suggest that a
defining factor dictating improvisation with analytics
is whether the User or Modeler is present during sur-
prises. Thus, there are four situations, represented
as quadrants in Fig. 7 and described in detail below,
with different capacity to improvise: (i) user and
modeler present, (ii) user alone (modeler absent),
(iii) modeler alone (user absent), and (iv) user and
modeler absent. Each situation requires different
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Fig. 7. Framework for research on improvisation with resilience analytics. A defining characteristic for improvisation is whether the User or
Modeler is present to adapt the CPS system to fundamental surprise. This defines four situations with different capacities for improvisation:
(i) user and modeler present, (ii) user alone (modeler absent), (iii) modeler alone (user absent), (iv) user and modeler absent. Future
research should identify how resilience analytics support or inhibit improvisation in each situation.
kinds of improvisation to adapt CPS systems to
fundamental surprise. Future development of data-
driven resilience analytics should be augmented with
research in improvisation for each of these situations.
5.1.1. User and Modeler Present
A CPS system with User and Modeler present
has both the greatest potential for improvisation to
fundamental surprise and is vulnerable to incom-
plete and harmful improvisation. The success of
improvisation in this case is a consequence of how
well Users and Modelers communicate and align
analytic goals. In situations of strong alignment, tacit
understandings of big data analytics enable collective
improvisation, where Users and Modelers are able to
improvise new models and actions without the need
for explicit rules. Incomplete communication and
ill-defined goals may require more explicit command
and control relationships to ensure User and Mod-
eler decisions do not interfere with each other. When
communication and alignment of goals is poor, User
and Modeler may actually work at cross-purposes,
inhibiting crisis response and making CPS systems
more vulnerable to fundamental surprise.
5.1.2. User Alone (Modeler Absent)
A CPS system with a User alone (no Modeler
present) is only capable to improvise in ways that
do not fundamentally change existing analytics. Nor-
mal activities like querying existing models for new
results or augmenting models with new information
may continue to work in the face of some surprises. A
User faced with fundamental surprise will be forced
to either abandon models and apply heuristics gained
from past experience or make a complete guess when
choosing a proper course of action.
5.1.3. Modeler Alone (User Absent)
A CPS system with the modeler alone (no user
present) is only capable to improvise in ways that
harness analytics for action. In some cases, the best
course of action is to override the model to stop un-
wanted outcomes. This approach to improvisation
can be improved by “rolling back” analytics to previ-
ous versions known to work or by creating a “kludge”
(e.g., a patch) that solves known issues without fun-
damentally changing the model. In extreme situa-
tions, big data analytics can be completely replaced
with new or different models that better serve CPS
resilience needs.
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5.1.4. User and Modeler Absent
Finally, a CPS system with neither a user nor
modeler present has the least capacity for improvi-
sation. Fully automated systems can only adapt to
surprise in predetermined ways. The most common
form of improvised action is when fail-safe and fail-
silent systems are activated to override systems and
prevent unwanted outcomes (Möller & Hansson,
2008). When these overrides are unable to contain
losses, safe-fail designs may automatically absorb
damages in predetermined and socially acceptable
ways (Kim et al., 2017). Otherwise, data analytics on
their own will lack any capacity to improvise, leading
to cascading failures and catastrophic losses.
5.2. The Future of Resilience Analytics
Resilience is about adaptive capacity (Hale &
Heijer, 2006; Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006;
Leveson et al., 2006; Madni & Jackson, 2009), and
the resilience research community is a part of this
process. Overemphasis on the benefits of data-driven
methods can widen the gap between people making
decisions during disruptive events (Users) and re-
searchers developing resilience analytics to support
them (Modelers). Ensuring the greatest capacity
for improvisation requires a Modeler-in-the-loop
who effectively communicates and aligns goals with
the User.
Much of what is needed is simply the discipline
to follow best practices for modeling and analysis:
working to interpret a User’s decision frame and
translate that information into effective tools; main-
taining communication between Modeler and User
during both Model development and deployment; in-
vestigating events that challenge assumptions rather
than discounting them. However, without more ac-
tive participation by the risk analysis community, re-
silience analytics will remain limited, not by a lack of
computational tools but by a lack of ways to adapt to
fundamental surprise. A more resilient future where
CPS systems are poised to adapt will require new un-
derstanding of surprise and improvisation in the con-
text of resilience research itself.
REFERENCES
Barker, K., Lambert, J. H., Zobel, C. W., Tapia, A. H., Ramirez-
Marquez, J. E., Albert, L., . . . Caragea, C. (2017). Defining re-
silience analytics for interdependent cyber–physical–social net-
works. Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure, 2(2), 59–67.
Brown, G. (2018). Chapter 6: Model building. In James J. Cochran
(Ed.), INFORMS analytics body of knowledge (1st ed., pp. 231–
274). Wiley Series in Operations Research and Management
Science. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
California Department of Water Resources. (2017). Lake
Oroville spillway incident: Timeline of major events. California
Data Exchange Center. Available at: https://www.water.ca.
gov/LegacyFiles/oroville-spillway/pdf/2017/Lake%20Oroville
%20events%20timeline.pdf.
California Department of Water Resources. (2018). Independent




Carlson, M. A. (2007). A brief history of the 1987 stock market
crash with a discussion of the federal reserve response. Working
Paper 2007-13 in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series
(FEDS), Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Af-
fairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC.
Choi, T.-M., & Lambert, J. H. (2017). Advances in risk analysis
with big data. Risk Analysis, 37(8), 1435–1442.
Clark, S. S., Chester, M. V., Seager, T. P., & Eisenberg, D. A.
(2018). The vulnerability of interdependent urban infrastruc-
ture systems to climate change: Could Phoenix experience a
Katrina of extreme heat? Sustainable and Resilient Infrastruc-
ture, 4, 1–15.
Comptroller of the United States. (2017). Data analytics to ad-
dress fraud and improper payments (Technical Report GAO-
17-339SP). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO).
Costanza, R. (2001). Visions, values, valuation, and the need for an
ecological economics: All scientific analysis is based on a “pre-
analytic vision,” and the major source of uncertainty about cur-
rent environmental policies results from differences in visions
and world views. BioScience, 51(6), 459–468.
Cutter, S. L., Ahearn, J. A., Amadei, B., Crawford, P., Eide, E.
A., Galloway, G. E., . . . Zoback, M. L. (2013). Disaster re-
silience: A national imperative. Environment: Science and Pol-
icy for Sustainable Development, 55(2), 25–29.
Eckstein, M. (2017, October 4). Navy Digital Warfare Office prov-
ing data analytics can help address nagging operational prob-
lems. U.S. Naval Institute News.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. (2015). FERC approves
final settlement in 2011 southwest blackout case. Retrieved from
https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2015/2015-2/05-26-
15.asp.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, North American Elec-
tric Reliability Council. (2012). Arizona-Southern Califor-
nia outages on 8 September 2011: Causes and recommen-
dations. FERC and NERC Staff. Available at: https://www.
ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/04-27-2012-ferc-nerc-report.pdf.
Ginsberg, J., Mohebbi, M. H., Patel, R. S., Brammer, L., Smolin-
ski, M. S., & Brilliant, L. (2009). Detecting influenza epidemics
using search engine query data. Nature, 457(7232), 1012–1014.
Golub, A., Keane, J., & Poon, S.-H. (2012). High fre-
quency trading and mini flash crashes. Retrieved from http://
doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182097.
Google AI Blog. (2015). The next chapter for flu trends. Retrieved
from https://ai.googleblog.com/2015/08/the-next-chapter-for-
flu-trends.html.
Hale, A., & Heijer, T. (2006). Defining resilience. In E. Hollnagel,
D. Woods, & N. Leveson (Eds.), Resilience engineering: Con-
cepts and precepts (pp. 95–123). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press.
Hollins, L., Eisenberg, D., & Seager, T. (2018). Risk and
resilience at the Oroville Dam. Infrastructures, 3(4), 49.
https://doi.org/10.3390/infrastructures3040049
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D., & Leveson, N. (Eds.) (2006). Resilience
engineering: Concepts and precepts. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
Press.
Huddleston, S., & Brown, G. (2018). Chapter 7: Machine learn-
ing. In James J. Cochran (Ed.), INFORMS analytics body of
1884 Eisenberg, Seager, and Alderson
knowledge (1st ed., pp. 231–274).Wiley Series in Operations
Research and Management Science. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Kim, Y., Eisenberg, D. A., Bondank, E. N., Chester, M. V., Mas-
caro, G., & Underwood, B. S. (2017). Fail-safe and safe-to-fail
adaptation: Decision-making for urban flooding under climate
change. Climatic Change, 145(3-4), 397–412.
Kirilenko, A., Kyle, A. S., Samadi, M., & Tuzun, T. (2017). The
flash crash: High-frequency trading in an electronic market.
Journal of Finance, 72(3), 967–998.
Knight, W. (2017). The dark secret at the heart of AI. MIT Tech-
nology Review, 120(3), 54–63.
Lanir, Z. (1986). Fundamental surprise. Eugene, OR: Decision Re-
search.
Lazer, D., Kennedy, R., King, G., & Vespignani, A. (2014). The
parable of Google Flu: Traps in big data analysis. Science,
343(6176), 1203–1205.
Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Zipkin, D., Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., Car-
roll, J., & Barrett, B. (2006). Engineering resilience into safety-
critical systems. In E. Hollnagel, D. Woods, & N. Leveson
(Eds.), Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts (pp. 95–
123). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press.
Lewis, M., & Baker, D. (2014). Flash boys. New York, NY: WW
Norton.
Madni, A., & Jackson, S. (2009). Towards a conceptual frame-
work for resilience engineering. IEEE Systems Journal, 3(2),
181–191.
McCrank, J. (2015, July 8). NYSE shut down for nearly four hours
by technical glitch. Reuters.
Mersereau, D. (2017, October 12). Hurricane Ophelia is one ex-
tremely weird storm. Popular Science.
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